Here is the video of the debate:
In Justin’s opening statement, he made four arguments:
- The existence of rational unbelief is more consistent with naturalism
- Darwinian evolution is more consistent with naturalism
- The hostility to life in most of the universe is is more consistent with naturalism
- The existence of suffering among sentient beings is more consistent with naturalism
These are all good arguments for naturalism. That’s what atheists argue if they are willing to bear the burden of proof – those are quality arguments.
In Blake’s opening statement, he made three arguments:
- The existence of “the moral arena” is more consistent with theism
- The intelligibility and discoverability of the universe is more consistent with theism
- The historicity of the resurrection of Jesus is more consistent with theism
These arguments are also good arguments for theism and the last one is good for Christian theism. Again, quality arguments.
Here’s part of his summary of his first argument, which I think is different from anyone else:
The Moral Arena is very unexpected if Naturalism is true
By contrast, on naturalism, a Moral Arena could not be more unexpected.
(a) A Universe is entirely unexpected,
(b) and even if there were one, the naturalist has no reason to expect that the Universe would be life-permitting (because of our “fine-tuning of physics for life” discoveries),
(c) and even if it were life-permitting, the naturalist has no reason to expected that there would be an origin of life event in it.
(d) and even if one (or more happened), the naturalist has no reason to expect that it would culminate in the existence of brains or anything that functions like a brain.
The alleged problem with this is that, it means that the likelihood of brains existing, on naturalism, are unfathomably low. Blake noted that the improbabilities of (a)-(d) could be multiplied together, and the likelihood of this chain of events assuming the truth of naturalism was well below .0000000001, just for the fine-tuning problem alone.
From there, getting consciousness
But getting such brains is not enough to get a Moral Arena. The next improbability was the brains being conscious. Once again, this could not be more unexpected on naturalism. Blake argued that consciousness is not adaptive on naturalism, because the brain is basically the machine, and consciousness was like smoke–the machine would evolve and operate the same with or without the smoke. Moreover, as a naturalist looks at the object of a brain, nothing “in it” would lead him to expect it has conscious experience, any more than looking at a star or electron would. Finally, Blake noted that many of the most prestigious naturalists argue that consciousness is not only entirely unexpected, but actually incompatible with naturalism–it has to be an illusion.
From there, getting beliefs
Blake then said, “Ok, but lets say you do get conscious brains. What is the likelihood, on naturalism, that they would also have these very particular things called beliefs?” He made the same moves: it could not be more unexpected on naturalism, and moreover some of the most prominent naturalists argue that beliefs are incompatible with naturalism. The reason is because beliefs are “about” things, but material objects (like rocks and brains) can’t be “about” anything. So beliefs are non-physical, which naturalism cannot accommodate.
From there, getting moral beliefs (for a Moral Arena)
Finally, Blake noted one more requirement: “Ok, so lets say you evolve conscious brains with beliefs, what is the likelihood that they would have moral beliefs in particular.” There is no reason to think moral beliefs, beliefs about good and evil, or right and wrong, would ever evolve twice in the entire Universe. But then why anticipate that they would have evolved even once? Again, Naturalism has no such reason. In each of these cases, all I can do is helplessly look at what has occurred, and say “oh, interesting.”
All together now
Calculating the final improbability involves multiplying the unlikelihood of brains evolving (.0000000001) with the unlikelihood of evolved brains being conscious (e.g. .01), with the unlikelihood of evolved conscious brains having beliefs (e.g. 01) with the unlikelihood of such brains having moral beliefs in particular (e.g. .5). The final probability is extraordinarily low, and insofar as moral beliefs are required for a moral arena, the likelihood of a moral arena existing on naturalism is unfathomably low (e.g. it seems like on naturalism, the likelihood of a moral arena would be far less than .000001%), while on theism it is not nearly so low (e.g. well over a 1% likelihood, and certainly no less). By definition then, the Moral Arena is evidence for theism, and it turns out to be phenomenally strong evidence given the difference in expectations. Originally, the plan was to give Justin a sheet of paper to fill these in, so we could talk specifically about any particularly unreasonable values he assigned to these probabilities.
If you are looking for a classy, civil debate, this is the debate you are looking for. Justin is a great speaker and presented four real arguments, but I think Blake had him beat on on substance, because Justin did not respond adequately to Blake’s arguments.
One point that came up in the debate was the distinction between coarse-tuning and fine-tuning, and whether the range of possible values for the numbers in question could be infinite. Allen Hainline saw the debate live, and he wrote this blog post on that topic.
TreeSearch.org is a web site for training Christians on how to map the flow of debates. If you haven’t already done so, check it out. Use the tree menu on the left to navigate the site by expanding topics that interest you.